To wit, an object in the computational sense ... describes a pattern, not a thing...

It seems to me that many of these bullet points are actually about classes, not objects. An object is an instance of a class, and, as such, it is a thing.

Then again, in some languages, classes are instances of a "Class" class. Okay, that's enough head-hurting for today....

Mike, sure, but the idea of a blueprinting objects has a decidedly transcendental air to it, one that doesn't jive entirely well with o-o philosophy. A software object is still not an object, either, it's a representational instance of a (human) ideal, but that's not really a helpful detail. That said, this whole post was about being measured, and acknowledging that there are similarities and differences.

Hey, Ian. I'm the person who sent Graham the "pro" statement. I also sent him the following reply to your "con" statement.

With all due respect to Ian, I'd say he's wrong:

describes a pattern, not a thing.

In OO Programming, a "class" describes a pattern. An object is a thing (it's an "instance" of a class). You can think of a class as a "theory" of an object. It enumerates the properties of an object, but more importantly, it defines how that object interacts with other objects.

The only drawback I see here is that classes add a whiff of Platonism. But I consider the distinction between an object and our formal theory of an object to be important and not at odds with your approach.

exists in stable relation to its properties.

Unless it generates its own methods, is prematurely garbage-collected, etc.

exists in stable relation to its abilities.

I don't know what that means.

has direct access to other objects via their properties and abilities

This depends what you mean by "direct". The popular concept of "hidden pointers" makes object access very indirect. In fact, the term "indirection" is used constantly in OO Programming.

is not a real object

Au contraire. If Popeye and Singapore are real, a programmatic object surely is.

(but can be made real, e.g. on magnetic tape or as a series of instructions on a processor stack)

If it's an object, it's already a series of instructions that's stored somewhere. I don't know how that really lends it any more reality, though.

always relates to an intentional object (both because it is a designed object and because it strives to embody and enact direct modeling of the world)

Once again, unless it is stochastic or codes itself. But the object itself doesn't really "strive" for anything. The point about modeling, however, is well-taken.

I think your strongest point is the one about modeling. As you can see in my response, that creates the possibility for a sort of conflation between different conceptual levels.

I agree with you that it's not worth obsessing about, so I'll drop it there :)

Asher, thanks for dropping by. Your comment is the same as Mike's above, more or less. I think calling me "wrong" is overdoing it. I was trying to simplify the comparison, but the important thing is that objects in OOP exist only as instances of patterns, not as isolated vacuum-packed objects, which reeks of more than a little Platonic idealism if you ask me.

The bit about generating methods is a bit pedantic, yes :)? I was looking for an overall characterization of OOP, not one that accounted for all variants, and I stand by the stable relations point. As for abilities, this is a reference to one of Graham's terms; think of methods, for example. It's really the same observation as properties.

The question of the realness of software objects is a pretty intersting one, maybe the one worth thinking about the most!

"I think calling me "wrong" is overdoing it"

Agreed.

"The bit about generating methods is a bit pedantic, yes :)?"

Agreed again ;).

I think the realness of software objects would also be the most interesting question to Graham, but it's probably less mind-bending to set the whole OOP analogy aside before getting into that.

To me, the interesting thing is the idea of an OO program as a "theory". The classes are the formal theory, the objects are really "models" of objects. Modeling objects in this philosophical sense is (to me) much more interesting than the superficial "Platonism" of it would suggest, because the focus is on how objects "network", and how they can form complex, dynamic systems that have properties not present in the parts.

Good to meet you, BTW. It's weird to come across other software people with philosophical interests. I haven't done a game since "Reproduction Man", but your writing here on games is good stuff. So far, I especially liked the "I want my 99 cents back" piece. I actually got a response to my "Boids" app in which the user requested his "free" back ;).

What you're describing sounds a lot like an ANT approach to OO programming, which seems quite promising of course. It also makes me feel even more that the promising questions about object-oriented philosophy and programming are about the status of programmatic objects rather than about analogies between the two domains, whether for comparison or contrast.

Hilarous that someone asked for his "free" back. "You wasted my time with your ideas and effort!" Clicked over to your site and find much fodder there, so I'll plan to peruse it in more detail.

I don't know much about Latour, but yes, I'm sort of thinking along those lines.

To refer back to Graham's "metaphysics videogame" idea, you could say that a lot of agent-based computer models are basically "scientific" videogames. Weather models and biological ANNs would fall into this category. The reason a model is needed in these applications (rather than just a set of mathematical formulas) is that the systems being explained are complex and dynamic.

But some models go further than describing a physical reality. An example from the top of my head would be Axelrod's model for political alliances. A model like this doesn't just have actors networking according to rules -- it introduces a metaphor that is the basis of the entire model (In this case, the idea that power relations can be represented as energy landscapes).

In my non-rigorously-proven opinion, metaphors and isomorphisms are at the heart of every conceptualization of reality. A "metaphysical" computer model goes "beyond physics" by showing whether a particular metaphor is apt.

As I said on one of Levi's recent posts, I also think that works of art can go beyond what formal, expository descriptions can say, precisely because of their metaphorical nature.

Metaphor is also at the heart of Graham's idea of causation, and, not just by accident, it's central to my idea of how to pragmatize (or operationalize, or specify) a speculative realism. So I'm right there with you.